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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
SONIAH ROSE EVANS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43205
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2014-14186
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Soniah Rose Evans pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, the
district court sentenced her to three years, with one and one-half years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction (“a rider”). Shortly thereafter, Ms. Evans moved for reconsideration
of her sentence, which the district court denied after a hearing. The district court
subsequently held a hearing to review Ms. Evans’s rider. The district court relinquished
jurisdiction and imposed Ms. Evans’s three-year sentence. Ms. Evans now appeals to
this Court.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On July 30, 2015, the State filed an Information against Ms. Evans, charging her
with possession of a controlled substance, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 372732(c) and possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, in violation of Idaho
Code § 37-2734A.1 (R, pp.47–48.) These charges arose out of the arrest of Ms. Evans
on July 20, 2014. (R., pp.23–25.) Law enforcement found methamphetamine and
syringes inside her purse. (R., pp.24–25.)
Ms. Evans pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. (Tr. Vol. I,2
p.6, Ls.14–22; R., p.67) She agreed to plead guilty to the possession charge, and the
State agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia charge. (Tr. Vol. I, p.3, L.17–p.4, L.3;
R., pp.67, 70.) The State would recommend a rider. (Tr. Vol. I, p.3, Ls.24–25; R., pp.67,
70.) The district court accepted Ms. Evans’s guilty plea.3 (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.23–25;
R., p.67.)
On February 5, 2015, the district court conducted a sentencing hearing.
(R., pp.89–90.) The district court sentenced Ms. Evans to three years, with one and
one-half years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.17, L.6–p.18, L.4.) On
February 6, 2015, the district court issued a Judgment - Retained Jurisdiction.
(R., pp.91–93.)

An Amended Information was filed on September 11, 2014. (R., pp.59–60.)
There are four bound transcripts on appeal. The first, Volume I, is a transcript of the
November 20, 2014, plea hearing. The second, Volume II, is a transcript of the February
5, 2015, sentencing hearing. The third, Volume III, is a transcript of the March 27, 2015,
hearing on Ms. Evans’s motion for reconsideration. The fourth, Volume IV, is a
transcript of the April 16, 2015, rider review hearing.
3 The State filed a motion to dismiss the paraphernalia charge, which the district court
granted. (R., pp.71, 73.) The State also filed a Second Amended Information with the
possession charge only. (R., pp.75–76.)
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On February 9, 2015, Ms. Evans filed a motion for reconsideration of her
sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”). (R., p.95.) On March 27, 2015, the
district court held a hearing on her motion. (R., pp.103–04.) The district court initially
granted Ms. Evans’s relief—placing her on a rider. (Tr. Vol. III, p.11, L.19–p.12, L.9.)
The State quickly informed the district court that Ms. Evans was already on a rider.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.12, Ls.10–16.) The district court explained that it did not know Ms. Evans
was on a rider, but, with that information, the district court would deny her motion.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.12, Ls.15–16, p.12, L.18–p.13, L.2.)
On April 16, 2015, the district held a rider review hearing. (R., pp.105–09.) The
district court relinquished jurisdiction and imposed Ms. Evans’s three-year sentence.
(Tr. Vol. IV, p.43, Ls.15–16; R., p.109.) The district court entered a Judgment and
Disposition on Retained Jurisdiction on April 17, 2015. (R., pp.110–11.)
On April 24, 2015, Ms. Evans filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.113–15.)
ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
three years, with one and a half years fixed, upon Ms. Evans, following her guilty
plea to possession of methamphetamine?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Evans’s motion for
reconsideration of her sentence?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Three
Years, With One And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Evans, Following Her Guilty Plea
To Possession Of Methamphetamine
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Evans’s sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). Accordingly, to show
that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Evans “must show that the sentence,
in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.”
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011).
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Ms. Evans asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends
that the district court should have sentenced her to a lesser term of imprisonment in
light of the mitigating factors, including her substance abuse issues, mental health
issues, acceptance of responsibility and remorse, and minimal criminal history.
Ms. Evans’s substance abuse issues and her willingness to obtain treatment
stand in favor of mitigation. A sentencing court should give “proper consideration of the
defendant’s [substance abuse] problem, the part it played in causing defendant to
commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s criminal
conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.”
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Here, Ms. Evans’s substance abuse
problem is the sole cause of her criminal conduct. Thirty-year-old Ms. Evans started
using methamphetamine at age twenty-eight or twenty-nine “at the urging of her exhusband.” (PSI, pp.13, 17.) Law enforcement observed “fresh injection marks” on both
of her arms when they arrested her. (PSI, p.4.) With proper substance abuse treatment
for Ms. Evans, any further criminal activity can be prevented. Ms. Evans in fact
demonstrated a commitment to recovery by remaining clean and sober since the
charges. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.13–12, p.14, L.17–p.15, L.1.) She also stated that she had
the “support and education to keep living a sober life.” (PSI, p13.) Thus, the impact of
Ms. Evans’s substance abuse on her criminal conduct, as well as her dedication to
recovery, support a lesser sentence.
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Although Ms. Evans had not used methamphetamine for an extended period of
time, she recognized the great harm to herself and her family caused by this drug use.
Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of mitigation.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). She explained, for example, that she was
“grateful” to get “in trouble” because she otherwise would not have gotten help. (PSI,
p.5.) She stated during the presentence investigation, “This experience was a humbling
experience in that meeting the other inmates showed me what I don’t want to do.” (PSI,
p.13.) Similarly, she stated at sentencing, “I have dealt with the consequences of this in
a much larger way other than just incarceration. The fall from where I had no idea I was
as far as in society, with my family and friends, has been tremendous.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.9,
Ls.8–12.) She also told the district court that she took accountability for the crime.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.6–7.) These statements are relevant mitigating facts in support of a
lesser sentence.
The past and present traumas in Ms. Evans’s life, coupled with her mental health
issues, are also relevant factors in favor of mitigation. Ms. Evans’s parents divorced
when she was one, and she lived with her mother most of the time. (PSI, p.9.) She
reported that her mother did not drink alcohol “but she was abusive.” (PSI, p.9.)
Moreover, Ms. Evans told the presentence investigator that she was molested as a child
by her step-brother and raped twice, once at age twelve and once at age twenty-nine.
(PSI, p.9.) She further reported that she was abused by her ex-husband, who has felony
convictions for domestic violence and battery. (PSI, pp.9, 10.) Beginning in August of
2014, Ms. Evans received counseling for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and anxiety.
(PSI, pp.13, 16; Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.14–16.) She informed the presentence investigator
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that she felt continued counseling was needed. (PSI, p.13.) In addition to this past
trauma and domestic violence, Ms. Evans’s husband’s four-year-old daughter recently
died in December of 2014 after choking on a bouncy ball. (Tr. Vol. II, p.12, L.24–p.13,
L.5.) According to her counsel at sentencing, Ms. Evans “has had a very difficult time
dealing with that. And she’s really reached out to her counselor in order to get through
some of that stuff, but it’s kind of compounded the situation of where she was at.”
(Tr. Vol. II, p.13, Ls.6–9.) In light of this information of Ms. Evans’s abusive childhood,
victimization as an adult, and other trauma in her life, Ms. Evans submits that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Finally, the absence of a serious criminal record supports a lesser sentence for
Ms. Evans. “The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts consider.”
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836 (2011). “It has long been recognized that ‘[t]he first
offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v.
Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Nice, 103
Idaho at 91). Here, as shown in the PSI, Ms. Evans had some prior juvenile and adult
misdemeanor convictions, but no prior felony convictions. (PSI, p.8.) Ms. Evans submits
that the district court failed to give adequate consideration to her minor criminal history.
In summary, Ms. Evans contends that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an unreasonable sentence in light of the mitigating circumstances, even when
weighed against the aggravating circumstances.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Evans’s Motion For
Reconsideration Of Her Sentence
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903
(Ct. App. 2014). In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must
“consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the
reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The Court “conduct[s] an independent
review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276
(Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence
under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule
35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
In this case, Ms. Evans’s testimony at the Rule 35 hearing provided the district
court with new information to warrant a reduction of her sentence. Ms. Evans first
informed the district court that she had been clean for over eight months. (Tr. Vol. III,
p.4, Ls.16–20.) She then stated that the rider program was “wonderful,” but she
believed that a local facility or outpatient treatment would be more beneficial to her
since this was her first felony offense. (Tr. Vol. III, p.4, Ls.21–24.) She testified that she
had connections in the community for that kind of treatment. (Tr. Vol. III, p.4, Ls.25–p.5,
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L.6.) She informed the district court, “I do have a plan that I put together just with
addresses, phone numbers, my support system. Also, with phone numbers, P&P, Self
Reliance, Restored Paths, Tim Remington, Center for New Direction and Real Life
Ministries I have been in contact with each and every one of those places . . . .” (Tr. Vol.
III, p.7, Ls.18–24.) She also testified that she appreciated the dangers of intravenous
methamphetamine use. (Tr. Vol. III, p.11, Ls.4–6.) She explained that she had learned
how methamphetamine use damaged her physical and mental health and affected her
family, friends, and entire community. Tr. Vol. III, p.11, Ls.6–11.) She told the district
court that she wanted to help other people and share her story to stop others from using
drugs. (Tr. Vol. III, p.11, Ls.11–18.)
In addition, Ms. Evans testified that she had a job lined up and money in savings
to provide for her children. (Tr. Vol. III, p.5, L.21–p.6, L.1.) Ms. Evans stated that she
obtained other job skills while on the rider. (Tr. Vol. III, p.6, Ls.4–13.) She felt “very
competent in the employment arena.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.6, Ls.11–13.)
In summary, Ms. Evans presented to the district court new or additional
information of her:

(1) recovery while on the rider; (2) treatment options in the

community; (3) support system; (4) greater acceptance of responsibility and
understanding of her dangerous behavior; (5) sound financial situation; and (6)
employment options. This information demonstrated that Ms. Evans could be
rehabilitated in the community without presenting any danger to society. It further
showed that she was sufficiently deterred from drug-related criminal activity and
adequately punished for her behavior. In light of this new information, Ms. Evans
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submits that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion for
reconsideration.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
The district court’s decision whether to retain jurisdiction and place the defendant
on probation or relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729 (2013); see also I.C. § 19-2601(4). “A court’s decision to
relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has
sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate.” State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889, 303 P.3d 241, 248 (Ct. App.
2013). Here, although Ms. Evans had some setbacks during her rider, she submits that
her overall progress warranted probation.
The major setback during Ms. Evan’s rider was her signed refusal to program
form. (PSI, p.39.) At the rider review hearing, however, she testified that she did not fully
understand the consequences of signing this form. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, L.14–p.9, L.6, p.18,
L.25–p.19, L.10, p.23, L.19–p.28, L.18.) In fact, Ms. Evans filled out an Individual
Release Plan for Probation the very next day, which further demonstrates her confusion
with regard to the effects of the refusal to program form. (PSI, pp.34–35.) Ms. Evans
also testified that any behavioral issues were due to her feeling “bullied” and out of
place on the rider. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.21, L.21–p.22, L.7.) Moreover, she received only one
official corrective action for “sleeping during program hours.” (PSI, p.25.) Thus,
Ms. Evans submits that the issues with her rider were not so severe as to justify
relinquishment.
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Ms. Evans had positive behavior on her rider. Ms. Evans volunteered, attended
church, and went to Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings. (PSI,
pp.36–37; Tr. Vol. IV, p.15, L.25–p.16, L.10.) She participated in the “12 Step” program
through her church. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.16, L.3.) She wrote a letter to the staff thanking them
for their help on the rider. (Def.’s Ex. A; Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, L.16–p.21, L.11.) In addition,
she reported in the Addendum to the PSI:
I am no longer void, dark, and empty. The darkness and pain that was so
apparent even outwardly is gone, replaced, by confidence truth and loyalty
to me, my sobriety and happy healthy life that God intended for me to live.
The staff at [South Boise Women’s Correctional Center] are incredible to
say the least, and saved my life. I am forever grateful and changed for the
betterment of my life.
(PSI, p.27.) Despite her issues on the rider, Ms. Evans obtained adequate treatment
and developed a new, positive mindset to be successful on probation.
Through her written release plan and testimony at the rider review hearing,
Ms. Evans provided a detail plan for success on probation. Ms. Evans discussed her
employment options, and she testified that she had secretarial, office management, and
“minor car maintenance” skills. (PSI, p.34; Tr. Vol. IV, p.18, Ls.1–5.) She listed seven
family members and close friends that offered “very” positive support. (PSI, p.34.) She
stated that she planned to go to the Good Samaritan Aftercare Program, attend church,
and regularly contact her three sponsors. (PSI, pp.34–35.) Ms. Evans explained, “I
really liked the Good Samaritan because it is faith based, and I feel I won’t be criticized
for my faith as much as I was down there. And I think that would be really good for me.”
(Tr. Vol. IV, p.17, Ls.20–23.) Ms. Evans testified that she had some money in savings to
pay for Good Samaritan Aftercare Program. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.17, Ls.18–20.) She also had
a stable place to live and a plan to reunite with her children after the school year.
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(Tr. Vol. IV, p.17, L.8–15, p.18, Ls.6–24; PSI. p.26.) These detailed plans for
Ms. Evans’s release show that probation was appropriate.
Based on all the above information, Ms. Evans submits that the district court
abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and imposing her sentence.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Evans respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate, or remand for a new sentencing hearing. In the alternative, she respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order denying her motion for
reconsider and remand, or vacate the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction and
remand for a new rider review hearing.
DATED this 3rd day of November, 2015.

___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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